This paper investigates the impact of stress testing results on bank's equity and CDS performance using a large sample of ten tests from the US CCAR and the European EBA regimes in the time period between 2010 and 2017. We find that passing banks experience positive abnormal equity returns and tighter CDS spreads, while failing banks show strong drops in equity prices and widening CDS spreads. Interestingly, we also document strong market reactions at the announcement date of the stress tests. A bank's asset quality and its return on equity at the time of the announcement are significant predictors of the pass/fail outcome of a bank.
Introduction
Over the scope of little more than a decade, bank stress tests have developed into a key supervisory tool that shapes headlines and fundamentally affects the main business operations of banks worldwide. The financial crisis of 2008-09 revealed that capital on bank balance sheets was insufficient -both in quantity and quality -to withstand large adverse shocks. Hence, following the crisis, regulators pushed for tighter rules and a systemic overhaul of the pre-crisis Basel II framework with a key focus on the refinement of bank capital. The post-crisis adjustments of these capital standards continue to present a challenge for financial institutions, especially in times of overall low bank profitability and crisis legacy costs. To assess if banks are keeping pace with regulatory demands, supervisors around the globe increasingly rely on stress testing.
Bank stress tests are analyses conducted under simulated unfavourable economic scenarios to assess the capitalization of banks on a forward-looking basis. They focus on several key risks, such as credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk, to determine the banks' financial health in crisis situations. Stress tests break with traditional supervisory approaches in their far-reaching disclosures and provide market participants with unprecedented insights into bank balance sheets. Moreover, at the same time, stress tests place follow-up requirements on banks that fall short of supervisory expectations.
The aim of this paper is to further develop the understanding of the impact of stress testing on banks' equity and CDS performance. We apply the abnormal return (AR) event study design to assess a sample of the ten most recent tests of the US CCAR and the European EBA regimes in the time period from 2010 to 2017. To the best of our knowledge, this presents the largest cross-jurisdictional sample analysed up-to-date. Following previous work in this field, we analyze short-term performance implications around stress test release and announcement events. Hence, this study provides new insights to the field of financial regulation as well as expands and updates findings of the existing literature. 1 For stress test result release events, this study identifies significant abnormal equity and CDS returns for tested banks. Passing banks, on aggregate, experience significantly positive abnormal equity returns of 59 basis points and significantly tighter CDS spreads of -83 basis points. To the contrary, failing banks earn significantly negative abnormal equity returns of -206 basis points and widening CDS spreads of 172 basis points. Taken together, we observe that the overall effect of stress tests is performance positive: On average, tested banks experience significantly positive abnormal equity returns of 36 basis points and significantly tighter CDS spreads of -72 basis points at the result release day.
For stress test announcement events, we observe a different picture and reveal capital market effects that are in the opposite direction to the result release events. Specifically, banks that are announced to be stress tested, earn significantly negative abnormal equity returns of 18 basis points and significantly wider CDS spreads of 78 basis points. Hence, the overall positive effect of stress tests on bank`s equity and CDS spreads on the result release day can be seen as a compensation for negative effects realized on the stress test announcement day. Moreover, when combining the release and the announcement to a joint stress test effect, we do not find a statistically significant impact on the equity and CDS performance of US and European banks.
Finally, our study investigates whether bank fundamentals at the announcement event are able to forecast the final stress test outcome with corresponding abnormal equity and CDS performance. For this purpose, we perform a multivariate regression analysis of a bank's stress test release outcomes on a number of different bank characteristics measured at the time of the announcement date. We show that a bank's asset quality and its return of equity are significant predictors of the pass/fail outcome of a bank. Moreover, our results reveal that banks with a higher capital buffer, higher asset quality, lower leverage, and a less risky business model earn higher abnormal equity returns at the stress test release. Hence, the outcomes of stress test results are (at least partly) predictable at its announcement and it is likely that banks optimize their capital structure changes accordingly. In line with this idea, we find that banks which fail stress tests, improve their regulatory capital ratios through new capital issues over the 180-days before the result release day. 2 Together, our findings contribute to three areas of the academic stress test literature. First, we contribute to a growing number of studies that provide empirically-orientated impact assessments of the effectiveness of EBA and CCAR stress tests. Predominately, existing studies focus on analysing and comparing stress test implications either across years or across jurisdictions. Findings vary by tests studied and methodology applied. For the US, Morgan, Peristiani and Savino (2014) and Flannery, Hirtle and Kovner (2015) find that bank equity and CDS performance is significantly affected by stress test releases. Neretina, Sahin, and De Haan (2014) analyze US tests between 2009 and 2015 and show that significant implications cannot be found for all of these stress tests. However, they confirm a benign environment for bank CDS spreads after release dates. Georgescu, Gross, Kapp and Kok (2017) assess the 2014 and 2016 EBA tests for European banks and confirm the marketmoving impact of stress tests. They argue that stress tests allow for improved discrimination between banks. Empirical evidence for the impact of stress test announcements and predictability of stress test results remains scarce. Ellahie (2012) does not find significant 2 A possible interpretation of this empirical finding is that failing banks anticipate their stress test failure and issue new capital before the release day to mitigate their loss from declining equity prices and widening credit spreads.
evidence that equity and CDS performance are associated to stress test announcements. Barucci, Baviera and Milani (2018) identify a relevant role of bank fundamentals, including capitalisation and non-performing exposures to predict test outcomes. Flannery et al. (2015) identify performance implications that increase in bank leverage. Morgan et al. (2014) , as well as, Carboni, Fiordelisi, Ricci and Lopes (2017) document a relationship between announcement returns and result performance. They find that bank security performance around the release is predominately driven by the unexpected capitalization results of banks. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the impact of stress testing results and announcements in the up-to-date largest sample covering ten tests of the US CCAR and the European EBA regimes in the time period from 2010 to 2017.
Second, results of empirical assessments have implications for the discussion and design of optimal stress test disclosures. Banks are generally agreed to suffer from a strong degree of opaqueness -the inaccessibility of dependable financial data to outsiders. Market reaction to stress test releases is then argued to prove the existence and consequent reduction of opaqueness. However, one should consider that scale and timing of test information provision are contested as a trade-off between restoring confidence in passing institutions and singling-out failing institutions at the risk of destabilising the financial system (Goldstein and Leitner, 2015) . Hence, studies that evaluate the market impact of stress test releases and announcements (such as ours) can be used to assess the modification of stress test designs (e.g., as for recent changes to EBA disclosures and reduced overall test transparency).
Third, a narrow field of literature has emerged around the wider implications of stress testing on bank conduct. Goldstein and Sapra (2014) identify the risk that banks engage in stress test management. At the same time, stress tests can incentivize the negligence of other risks not directly covered in the stress test. In their empirical analysis, Flannery et al. (2015) , however, do not find evidence of these distortionary impacts. Our findings on increased capital issuances of failing banks before stress test releases contribute to this area of literature.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset and the event study methodology. Section 3 describes the relationship between stress test releases as well as equity and CDS performance. Section 4 expands this analysis to announcement dates. Section 5 identifies the link between underlying bank determinants and stress test results. Section 6 concludes.
Dataset and methodology

Stress tests
We cover all ten important stress tests conducted in the US and Europe in the time period from 2010 to 2017. Key features of these stress tests are provided in Table 1 . For each stress test, we report the announcement date, the release date, the competent authority, the number of banks tested, the number of banks failed, the hurdle rate, the regulatory followup, and the stress test scenarios. 3 In addition, we provide an overview of the detailed timeline of all stress tests in the US and Europe in Figure 1 .
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 around here]
For US stress tests, this study follows the existing literature by focusing on the US CCAR which is the relevant stress test for the largest banks with balance sheet volumes above $50bn. The CCAR features both a qualitative and a quantitative element, either of which a bank can fail. The quantitative CCAR provides information on forecasted capital positions.
The qualitative CCAR verifies bank internal capital planning processes and governance.
Over the sample analyzed, the number of tested banks with tradable equity/or CDS ranges 
Equity and CDS performance event study
This paper employs the event study methodology pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) and MacKinlay (1997) to compute abnormal return estimates which has become the standard approach in the stress test literature. The event study setup is illustrated along the four steps (i) to (iv) traditionally involved in event studies. We provide summary statistics in (v).
(i) Defining events
This study considers the day of stress test disclosure by the supervisor as the key event.
Since results are published upon market closing, the event date is the next available trading day and around this day the abnormal security performance is analyzed. In a second step, this paper expands its analysis to the stress test announcement date -the first communication of supervisors to the public in a stress testing cycle. 7
(ii)
Estimating normal returns
We obtain daily per-bank equity prices from Reuters Datastream and CDS spreads (5 yearsenior) from the S&P's SNL Financial Database. The estimation of normal returns follows the recent stress test literature and applies a one-factor market model according to Sharpe (1964) . First, security prices are transformed into logarithmic returns using ,
6 Since balance sheet size is the key criteria on which stress tested banks are selected, any kind of peer group analysis is undermined by the fact that stress-test and peer group allocation is not random.
7 Some ambiguity exists in the literature regarding the classification of the announcement event. We follow recent central bank working papers by relying on the date on which the first stress test related press release is made available by a supervisor. This press release typically reveals the set of tested banks and gives details on the applied stress test methodology.
where is the log return and is the end-of-day market closing price for day of security . This approach is applied to both equity prices as well as CDS spreads. It follows the work of Flannery et al. (2015) and Morgan et al. (2014) who also analyze CDS spreads as a logarithmic return series. Since CDS spreads are quoted in basis points and are increasing in riskiness, their interpretation is opposite to that of equity performance. A reduction in CDS spreads is referred to as 'spread tightening'. Vice versa, an increase in CDS spreads is referred to as 'spread widening'.
Second, an estimation window of 120-trading days that ends 10 trading days before the event (-10, -130) is constructed. 8 The exclusion of the last 10 trading days should shield the estimation against event related drifts. The parameters and of the one-factor model are then estimated over the estimation window using (2)
In our main specification, we follow Morgan et al. (2014) Candelon and Sy, 2015, and Resti, 2013) or apply a hybrid model (i.e., a two-factor model including a country and a regional banking sector index, as in Georgescu et al., 2017) . 
For the purpose of this study, AR refers to , i.e., the abnormal return observable on the event day.
(iv) Estimating cumulative returns
In addition to the AR, a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is applied in our analysis, which expands from the day before the event to the day after the event (+1,-1):
.
The CAR is the second key performance measure considered in this study.
(v) Summary
Using the event study methodology as described above, we derive stress test-related abnormal equity and CDS return estimates across stress tests. For the equity event study, we compute 661 abnormal return estimates related to stress test release (and 657 for stress test announcement) events. Out of these 661 estimates, 306 are for retrieved for passing banks, 29
are for failing banks, and 326 for non-tested peer-group banks. For the CDS event study, we compute 186 abnormal return estimates: 149 for passing banks, 14 for failed banks, and 23
for non-tested peer-group banks. A detailed list of all banks participating in our stress test sample with corresponding available abnormal equity and CDS return estimates is reported in Appendix A.3. We use these estimates to assess the impact of stress test results and announcements on bank's equity and CDS performance in Section 3 and Section 4.
Do stress test releases impact equity and CDS performance?
Assessing performance differences over a sample of ten stress tests is appealing since the comparability of previous studies covering subsamples remains limited. This study starts with an analysis of abnormal equity and CDS performance associated with stress test releases. We analyze the performance of passing vs. failing banks in Section 3.1, and the performance of tested vs. non-tested banks in Section 3.2.
Performance comparison: Passing vs. failing banks
We start our empirical analysis by investigating the impact of stress test release outcomes (i.e., a pass or fail decision) on the impact of a bank's abnormal equity and CDS performance. Results are reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 around here]
In line with the intuition that stress testing results provide important new information to market participants, we observe strong and significant effects on banks' equity and CDS prices. Passing banks, on aggregate, experience significantly positive abnormal equity returns of +59 basis points and significantly tighter CDS spreads of -83 basis points at the release date. We find that these patterns hold both for the US CCAR and the European EBA stress tests, i.e., passing banks in the CCAR (EBA) stress tests experience positive abnormal equity returns of +64 (+54) basis points and tighter CDS spreads of -14 (-138) basis points at the release date.
At the same time, we also observe that failure of stress tests is heavily penalized by market 
Performance comparison: Tested vs. non-tested banks
The existing literature does not give a clear picture on the impact of stress tests on the performance of tested banks. Candelon and Sy (2015) (2017) find an overall marginally negative impact on participating banks. Hence, we now examine the impact of stress testing on the equity and CDS performance of tested banks and compare it to peer group performance. Table 3 reports the results on the overall effect of stress test releases on bank's abnormal equity and CDS performance in the CCAR and EBA tests between 2010 and 2017. 10 [Insert Table 3 around here]
Across all stress tests covered, we document that the overall effect of stress test releases is performance positive. On average, tested banks experience significantly positive abnormal equity returns of 36 basis points and significantly tighter CDS spreads of -72 basis points.
These results are confirmed when we look at CAR instead of AR as our main measure of abnormal performance.
When we dig deeper, we find that the high-level results do not hold for all individual tests.
For CCAR tests, equity ARs are negative in the 2014 and 2016 iterations with an average 9 We only find one negative equity market response to passing banks in the case of the CCAR 2014 stress test and thereby confirm the finding of Neretina et al. (2014) .
impact of -58 basis points and -8 basis points. We also do not find a significant impact on European banks' equity performance except from the EBA 2010 stress test, whose strong results are consistent with a 'novelty stress test effect'. On the CDS side, differences between EBA and CCAR appear substantial. EBA stress tests releases have resulted in a significant abnormal spread tightening of -142 basis points, while the direction of the impact is less clear for the banks in the CCAR sample.
The impact of stress testing on equity and CDS performance of tested banks is particularly positive in the CCAR 2017 test, which has, to the best of our knowledge, not been assessed in the existing literature up-to-date. This result does not confirm the empirical results of Glasserman and Tangirala (2015) who highlight the risk of diminishing information value of stress test results as they become a consistent feature of the supervisory agenda. Hence, the release of stress testing results delivers important information to market participant even in the sixth consecutive iteration of Fed annual stress testing. 11
The examination of equity and CDS abnormal return magnitudes across Table 2 and Table 3 reveals another interesting observation: For the aggregate sample of tested banks, we show --in Table 3 --that the magnitude of the abnormal CDS return (-72 basis points), on average, is twice as large as the abnormal equity return (+36 basis points). The pass/fail split of Table   2 reveals that this observation is mostly driven by a stronger CDS (-83 basis points) than equity (+59 basis points) response for passing banks. To the contrary, for failing banks, market reaction on banks' equity (-206 basis points) is more pronounced than on banks' CDS spreads (+172 basis points). Hence, the likelihood for passing a stress test appears to be more strongly incorporated in a bank's equity value than in its CDS spread. 12 Finally, we also check whether stress-testing result releases also show significant spillover effects to non-tested banks (as noted by Flannery et al., 2015 , for a group of selected US stress tests). In our large sample of ten stress tests both from the US and Europe, we do not observe a clear picture. We find, on average, that non-tested banks earn a positive (negative) equity return of +19 (-27) basis points when looking at the daily AR (three-day CAR). In terms of CDS performance, we observe that non-tested banks show tighthening CDS spreads of -67 basis points (-126 basis points) for the abnormal (cumulative abnormal)
performance. However, these numbers are not statistically significantly different from zero.
Hence, we do not find clear evidence of consistent spillover effects from tested to non-tested financial institutions across our sample.
Do stress test announcements impact equity and CDS performance?
The previous section of this paper confirms a significant impact of stress test releases on a bank's equity and CDS performance. Do we also see an immediate market reaction solely based on the fact that a stress test for a bank is announced? We investigate this question in Section 4.1. Furthermore, we investigate the combined stress test impact, i.e., the market impact of the stress test release and the stress test announcement in Section 4.2.
The role of stress test announcements: Tested vs. non-tested banks
As already stated in Section 2.2, we define the first communication of supervisors to the public in a stress testing cycle as the stress test announcement event. This announcement typically takes place more than six months before the stress test release. Recent academic studies illustrate that, at the time of the stress test announcement, market participants are likely to form preliminary assessments of banks' expected equity and CDS stress test performance. As an example, Carboni et al. (2017) find that investors are able to identify weak banks with the announcement of the EBA 2014 stress test and Morgan et al. (2014) show that also the 2009 Fed SCAP, the CCAR's predecessor, results were, to a certain extent, anticipated. We follow these previous approaches and examine the relevance of the announcement event for the equity and CDS performance of banks. Results are reported in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 around here]
We find that the average impact of stress test announcements is very different from the average impact of stress test results on banks' performance. While Table 3 displays that tested banks experience positive abnormal equity returns of 36 basis points and tighter CDS spreads of -72 basis points at the stress test result day, we observe --in Table 4 --that tested institutions experience negative abnormal equity returns of -18 basis points and wider CDS spreads of 78 basis points at the announcement day. Again, these results are robust when we apply the CAR instead of the AR as our main measure of abnormal performance.
As in the case of result releases, the announcement performance varies across stress tests.
For banks' equity performance, we observe that the announcement effect leads to negative returns in four out of six cases in the US, and in two out of four cases in Europe. On the CDS side, we show that the overall widening CDS spreads are mainly due to the EBA stress test announcements and not due to the CCAR announcements.
Finally, we also look at spill-over effects between tested-and non-tested banks at the announcement day. As for the release day, we cannot document significant spillover effects from tested to non-tested financial institutions at the announcement day in our sample.
Combining announcement and result events
After having reported the different directions of the average stress test announcement and the stress test result effect, we now turn to investigate the combined effect in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 around here]
We find that the joint impact of test announcement and release result cancels out and is close to zero for the equity and CDS performance of tested banks. Specifically, when taking account of both effects, tested banks experience positive equity returns of 18 basis points and wider CDS spreads of 6 basis points with t-statistics displaying values smaller than one are being far from statistically significant.
On the individual stress test level, we also document that stress test release and announcement effects point in opposite directions, especially in Europe. We observe --for all European stress tests -that a positive (negative) announcement event performance is followed by a negative (positive) result event performance. We obtain slightly weaker, but qualitatively similar results also for US banks.
To summarize, we find that the overall positive effect of stress tests on bank`s equity and CDS spreads on the result release day can be seen as a compensation for a negative effect realized on the stress test announcement day. Hence, the mostly positive market response to stress test releases predominately corrects a more negative initial expectation that develops at the time of stress test announcements.
Can outcomes of a bank's stress test be predicted?
Following the assessment of stress test performance around announcement and result events, we now further investigate the link between the two. In particular, we examine whether stress test outcomes (pass/fail) and associated financial market outcomes at the stress test release day can be predicted with bank fundamentals at the stress tests announcement date. 13 Following the existing literature, we construct different fundamentals that give a holistic representation of the state of a bank. All measures are based on accounting data available at the time of the stress test announcement. EXCESS CAP is defined as the difference between bank regulatory capital ratio at the announcement event and minimum required capitalisation to pass the stress test and measures bank capitalization going into the stress test. ASSET QUALITY assesses overall balance sheet quality and is defined as the ratio of non-performing assets to regulatory capital (CET1). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of CET1 capital to total balance sheet size -hence, the measure corresponds to the leverage ratio supervisors employ. RWA/A captures the riskiness of business models, following the premise that riskier banks feature a higher RWA to asset density. ROAE measures the return on equity over the trailing 12-month period, a key determinant for bank internal capital generation. Finally, given the relation between announcement and result performance uncovered earlier, and the findings of Morgan et al. (2014) , ANNOUNCEMENT AR is the abnormal equity market reaction at the announcement date of the stress test. All fundamental data is sourced from S&P's SNL Financial database and collected at the time of the stress test announcement.
To predict the outcome of banks' stress tests and corresponding performance at the release day we perform different regression models in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 14 Note that our sample size is reduced in this empirical analysis due to the unavailability of some of the bank characteristics, mostly for smaller US banks.
In specification (2) In specification (3) we repeat the investigation of regression model (2), but use abnormal CDS performance as the dependent variable. We observe that abnormal CDS performance at the release day is statistically unrelated to bank characteristics, measured at the announcement day. Note, however, that the weak statistical relationships are enforced by the fact that we only can use data from 73 banks in this analysis due to missing CDS spreads of some financial institutions.
Since stress tests outcomes are (at least) partially predictable, it is likely that banks are optimizing their capital structure accordingly. To investigate this idea, we check 90 bank capital issuances of tested and non-tested banks over the 180-days window before and 180-days after the stress test release day and assess the impact the capital increases have on a bank's CET1 ratio. Results are displayed in Figure 2 .
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Our results indicate that banks which fail their stress test disproportionally increase their capital before the release date. Eight out of ten failing banks, announced their capital raising at least 60 days before the stress test release. The six transactions of failing banks that raised more than USD 500 million were announced 104 days before the stress test release. This clustering is not observable for stress test passing as well as non-tested banks. We argue that capital issuances before the release date have two advantages for stress test failing banks:
First, banks can pre-emptively address market concerns regarding insufficient capitalisation that surface with the stress test release. 15 Second, failing banks anticipate their lack of success and issue new capital before the result release day to mitigate their loss from 15 It is important to highlight that any capital actions conducted in this window will not directly affect stress test outcomes, since the supervisor 'freezes' a bank's balance sheet with the announcement of the stress test.
declining equity prices and widening credit spreads after the public announcement of their stress test failure.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine the impact of stress testing results and announcements on bank's equity and CDS performance using a large sample of ten tests from the US CCAR and the European EBA regimes in the time period between 2010 and 2017. For stress tests announcements, we obtain a different picture: Banks, that are going to be stress tested, experience significantly negative abnormal equity returns of 18 basis points and significantly wider CDS spreads of 78 basis points on the announcement day. A possible interpretation of these two contrary effects is, that the overall positive effect of stress tests on bank`s equity and CDS spreads on the result release day compensates investors for negative effects realized on the stress test announcement day. Also, we document that an empirical investigation has to take into account the performance results of both the release and the announcement effect to be viewed as complete.
Finally, we check whether bank fundamentals are able to forecast the final stress test outcome as well as corresponding abnormal equity and CDS performance. Our results indicate that a bank's asset quality and its return of equity at the time of the announcement are significant predictors of the pass/fail outcome of a bank. Moreover, the abnormal equity returns at the release date are predictable at the announcement date using certain bank characteristics. In particular, banks with a higher capital buffer, higher asset quality, lower leverage, and a less risky business model earn higher abnormal equity returns at the stress test release. We find preliminary evidence that banks optimize their capital structure according to this predictability of stress test outcomes. 
Appendix
Appendix A.2: US and European stress tests
The three key stress tests conducted by US and European supervisors are briefly outlined below. This study focuses on the latter two.
Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST)
The DFAST stress testing regime covers US banks with balance sheet sizes ranging from $10bn to $50bn. In general, DFAST presents a less stringent version of the US CCAR.
Overall, sophistication of estimation approaches remains limited. For example, capital plan assumptions are based on average, and from 2016 onwards, last years dividends. Stock issuances and repurchases are ignored (Petrella and Resti, 2016) . While this approach renders the DFAST highly comparable, it lacks firm-specific considerations. These institutional limitations, as well as, the fact that the focus is on smaller banks, explain why DFAST results are typically overshadowed by CCAR result releases that follow a week later.
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR):
The CCAR assesses both a quantitative, as well as, a qualitative dimension of US banks with balance sheets in excess of $50bn. The quantitative CCAR provides information on banks forecasted capital positions under three Fed-defined economic scenarios. In addition to predefined scenarios, banks include internally developed scenarios that provide a representation of the risks for specific institutions. In contrast to the quantitative part, the qualitative CCAR serves to verify and assess bank internal capital planning processes. This includes an assessment of bank stress testing practices, methodology and governance controls.
European Stress Tests:
Europe saw an increasing centralisation of stress testing responsibility. 
This table provides an overview of the banks included in the EBA stress tests. EQ ✓ indicates banks with equity event study returns. CDS ✓ indicates banks with CDS event study returns. Inc ✓ indicates banks that were stress tested, all non-tested banks are part of the peer group in that specific year. Pass ✓ indicates banks that passed the assessment. All data is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. 
Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of stress tests Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of stress tests considered in this study. We cover all ten important recent stress tests conducted in the US and Europe in the time period from 2010 to 2017. The stress test announcement date is defined as the first communication of supervisors to the public in a stress testing cycle. The result release date is defined as the next available trading day after stress test results are published. All data from the US taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website.
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Figure 2: Patterns in bank capital issuances Figure 2 illustrates the timing and magnitude of bank capital market actions for 53 stress tested banks. We use the nominal size of the capital increases to determine the percentage point impact the action has on the CET1 capitalisation of the bank. The capital market action announcement date is plotted in relation to the respective stress test result announcement date. All banks that conducted capital market actions and failed the stress test in the 6-month period are labelled with names. The markers illustrate different capitalisation levels of passing banks. Data is sourced from SNL Financial and Reuters. Three scenarios on a nine-quarter horizon. More recently CCAR tests have switched to a fivescenario approach, of which two are generated by the bank. Table 1 reports key features of the stress tests investigated in this study. We cover all ten important recent stress tests conducted in the US and Europe in the time period from 2010 to 2017. For each stress test, we report the announcement date, the release date, the competent authority, the number of banks tested, the number of banks failed, the hurdle rate, the regulatory follow-up, and the stress test scenarios. *denotes the number of banks with equity and/or CDS spreads available. **This study focuses on the hurdle rate regarding the lowest tier of regulatory capital (typically CET1). This represents the key hurdle for banks to pass. All data from the US taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. Table 2 provides results of the empirical impact of the stress test release outcome banks' equity and CDS performance for passing and failing banks. We estimate average abnormal equity and CDS performance for passing and failing banks according to the description in Section 2.2. AR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 1-day estimation window. CAR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 3-day (-1,+1) estimation window. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All data from the US is taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. We obtain daily perbank equity prices from Reuters Datastream and CDS spreads (5 year-senior) from the S&P's SNL Financial Database. Table 3 provides results of the empirical impact of the stress test release outcome on banks' equity and CDS performance for tested and non-tested banks.. We estimate average abnormal equity and CDS performance for passing and failing banks according to the description in Section 2.2. AR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 1-day estimation window. CAR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 3-day (-1,+1) estimation window. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All data from the US is taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. We obtain daily perbank equity prices from Reuters Datastream and CDS spreads (5 year-senior) from the S&P's SNL Financial Database. Table 4 provides results of the empirical impact of the stress test announcement on banks' equity and CDS performance for tested and non-tested banks.. We estimate average abnormal equity and CDS performance for passing and failing banks according to the description in Section 2.2. AR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 1-day estimation window. CAR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 3-day (-1,+1) estimation window. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All data from the US is taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. We obtain daily perbank equity prices from Reuters Datastream and CDS spreads (5 year-senior) from the S&P's SNL Financial Database. Table 5 provides results of the empirical impact of the joint stress test release event and announcement on banks' equity and CDS performance for tested and non-tested banks.. We estimate average abnormal equity and CDS performance for passing and failing banks according to the description in Section 2.2. AR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 1-day estimation window. CAR refers to the abnormal returns computed using a 3-day (-1,+1) estimation window. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All data from the US is taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. We obtain daily per-bank equity prices from Reuters Datastream and CDS spreads (5 year-senior) from the S&P's SNL Financial Database. Table 6 provides results of different regression models that seek to predict the outcome of a bank's stress test with corresponding performance at the release day. Specification (1) reports the results of a logistic regression to assess the predictive power of the above-mentioned bank characteristics (EXCESS CAP, ASSET QUALITY, LEVERAGE, RWA/A, ROAE, ANNOUNCEMENT AR) on the binary pass / fail stress test outcome of a bank. In specification (2) we then run an OLS regression (with stress test and year fixed effects) to predict the abnormal equity-and CDS performance of banks at the stress test release using the same independent variables. In specification (3) we repeat the investigation of regression model (2), but use abnormal CDS performance as the dependent variable. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All data from the US is taken from the official stress test reports available on the Fed website. All data from Europe is taken from the official stress test reports available on the CEBS and EBA website. We obtain daily per-bank equity prices from Reuters Datastream and CDS spreads (5 year-senior) from the S&P's SNL Financial Database.
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